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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Seva Resorts, Inc. v. Hodel, 876 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1989).
Seva Resort, Inc., a Nevada Corporation, and Seva Devel-
opment Corporation, an Arizona corporation, the plaintiffs,
entered into a master lease agreement with the Navajo Nation.
This agreement was the result of negotiations between the Nav-
ajo Nation, the plaintiff corporations, and the National Park
Service to develop a marina resort complex on the adjacent
Indian and federal lands located at Antelope Point in Glen
Canyon National Recreation Area.
Separately from the lease agreement, a concession and sub-
concession contract was signed and submitted to the National
Park Service by the Navajo Nation for the mandatory 60-day
review by Congress pursuant to the Concessions Policy Act of
1965.1 Congress made no changes to the concession or sub-
concession contracts. However, the Secretary of the Interior
(Donald Hodel) refused to sign the contracts because a dispute
arose between the Navajo Nation and the plaintiff corporations.
The National Park Service had requested that the Secretary
decline to sign the contracts because the dispute could not be
resolved.
The plaintiffs sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior
to sign and execute a concession contract concerning the federal
and Indian trust lands entered into between the National Park
Service and the Navajo Nation pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 20-20f.
The plaintiff corporations also sought to compel the Secretary
to approve a subconcession contract between the plaintiffs and
the Navajo Nation pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 415.2 The District
Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction against
the Secretary. 3
The issues before the Ninth Circuit were (1) whether the
Secretary had the authority to decline signing the contract; (2)
whether the Secretary had a duty to sign the concession contract
after the 60-day waiting period expired without disapproving the
contract; and (3) whether the Secretary sufficiently considered
1. 16 U.S.C. § 20 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 51.1 and
51.4(d) (1988)).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (Supp. IV 1986) (codified at 25 C.F.R. 162.14 (1988)).
3. Seva Resorts, Inc. v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. 1542, 1551 (D. Ariz. 1987).
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congressional policy in declining to sign the subconcession con-
tract.
The court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
the Secretary could not decline to sign the concession contracts
because the plaintiffs confused the master lease approval with
the concession contracts. 4 The lease fell within 25 U.S.C. § 415
but the concession contracts were subject to 16 U.S.C. § 20.5
The Ninth Circuit found that "the District Court correctly
determined that the Secretary acted within his statutory author-
ity" when the Secretary concluded that he had the power to
terminate negotiations before he signed the concession contract
and after the mandatory 60-day waiting period. 6 The court
conducted an independent review of the factors to be considered
in congressional concession policy and found that the Secretary
properly considered all factors.7 The Ninth Circuit held that the
Secretary's decision was not an abuse of discretion, arbitrary or
capricious, and affirmed the district court. 8
FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION: MAJOR CRIMES ACT
United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989).
A Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court convicted Francis Ant of
assault and battery of his niece after he pleaded guilty to the
offense without counsel to represent him. Under tribal law' and
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)2, the right to appointed
counsel for tribal criminal proceedings is not required, but
assistance of counsel could be obtained at the option and own
expense of the Indian. 3 A federal indictment was filed charging
Ant with voluntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112-1153
and Ant was furnished with appointed counsel. 4
The issue before the court was "whether an uncounseled guilty
plea in tribal court in accordance with tribal law and the ICRA,
but which would have been unconstitutional if made in federal
4. Seva Resorts, Inc. v. Hodel, 876 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1989).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1398.
7. Id. at 1399.
8. Id. at 1399-1401.
1. Revised Law and Order Ordinances of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Mon-
tana, ch. 1, § 9 (1987).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
3. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1982).
4. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1391 (9th Cir. 1989).
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court, can be admitted as evidence of guilt in a subsequent
federal prosecution involving the same criminal acts."-5
The Ninth Circuit accepted the district court's finding that
the guilty plea was valid under the tribal law and the ICRA.6
However, after examination of the possible violation of the sixth
amendment 7 by the uncounseled guilty plea, the court held that
the guilty plea was constitutionally infirm.8 The burden of proof
was on the government to establish that there was a waiver 9 and
the court stated the facts did not support a waiver.10
The court reversed the finding of the district court that the
guilty plea was admissible as evidence in a federal prosecution
holding that the plea would have been in violation of the sixth
amendment if made in a federal court."
GAMING
Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. Hodel, 883 F.2d
890 (10th Cir. 1989).
Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. (EMCI) managed a
bingo operation located on Citizen Band Potawatomi trust land.
EMCI sought contract approval for two bingo management
contracts from the Secretary of the Interior as required by 25
U.S.C. § 81.' Unapproved contracts are null and void under
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1392.
7. The sixth amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
8. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1393.
9. The court used as a standard for waiver a "knowingly and intelligently, with
an understanding of the charges, the possible penalties, and the dangers of self-
representation." Id. at 1394 (quoting United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 186-87
(9th Cir. 1973)).
10. Id. at 1394.
11. Id. at 1395-96.
1. 25 U.S.C. § 81 states in relevant part:
No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians ... for the
payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value, in present or in
prospective, or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him, or any other
person in consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands .... unless
such contract or agreement be executed and approved as follows:
First. Such agreements shall be in writing, and a duplicate
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section 81.2 EMCI filed suit seeking injunctive relief prohibiting
Donald Hodel, Secretary of the Interior, and the Citizen Band
Potawatomi Tribe of Oklahoma (Tribe) from enforcing disap-
proval of the contracts; mandamus relief requiring the Secretary
to approve the contracts; and declaratory relief stating that
section 81 did not apply to the contract.
The issues before the court were (1) whether tribal sovereignty
barred EMCI's suit, and (2) whether the Tribe was an indispen-
sable party under Rule 19.3 The district court granted the Tribe's
motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity.4 The
district court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over the suit
against the federal officials, and also denied the Tribe's request
for sanctions under Rule 115 for filing a frivolous appeal.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's decision
that EMCI's suit was barred by sovereignty immunity finding
that ". . . Indian Nations are exempt from suit."16 The court
also held that ".... a waiver of sovereign immunity 'cannot be
implied but must be unequivocally expressed.' 7 The court dis-
tinguished Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone
of it delivered to each party.
Second. It shall bear the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs indorsed
upon it.
2. 25 U.S.C. § 81 also stated in relevant part: "All contracts or agreements made
in violation of this section shall be null and void. .. ."
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 19. Rule 19(b) sets forth a four-factor test to determine when
a party is considered "indispensable". The factors include:
[F]irst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures,
the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
4. See Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 685 F. Supp.
221 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
6. Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 892 (10th
Cir. 1989) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (omitting
citation)).
7. Id. at 890.
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Tribes3 because the "exception" to sovereign immunity was not
met.9
In examining the indispensable party issue, the court held that
the Tribe was a necessary party because of their interest in
maintaining sovereign immunity outweighed EMCI's or federal
interests. 10 The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the denial of rule
11 sanctions because the trial court's discretion was not abused
when it declined to impose sanctions. 1
PROBATE APPEALS FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
Kicking Woman v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1989).
Relatives of a deceased Native American disputed the intestate
succession to interest in allotted trust land held by a Blackfeet
tribal member. The administrative law judge determined that
the decedent's natural son was the sole heir. The decedent's
brother and other relatives appealed the decision of the admin-
istrative judge to the Department of the Interior's Board of
Indian Appeals (IBIA). The IBIA affirmed the decision of the
administrative judge, and the contesting relatives filed an action
challenging the Board's decision in the District Court of Mon-
tana against the Secretary of the Interior and the natural son
alleging a violation of the fifth amendment due process clause.'
The issues were (1) whether the federal courts have jurisdiction
to review merits of proceedings in which the Secretary of the
Interior settled a claim to allotted Indian trust land pursuant to
25 U.S.C. § 3722 and 43 U.S.C. § 14643; and (2) whether the
8. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
9. Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc. v. Hodel, 883 F.2d 890, 892 (10th
Cir. 1989). The court identified the three factors in Dry Creek Lodge as "an alleged
violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, the denial of a tribal forum, and a conflict
involving a matter outside internal tribal affairs."
10. Id. at 894.
11. Id. at 895.
1. The fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
2. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 25 U.S.C. § 331
(1982). Title 25, section 372 states in relevant part:
When any Indian to whom an allotment of land has been made, or may hereafter
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
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plaintiffs had a constitutional claim that would except the non-
reviewability of heirship under 25 U.S.C. § 372.
The court found that 25 U.S.C. § 3714 mandated that the
natural son was the heir and agreed with the district court that
federal law rather than tribal law controlled the disposition of
allotted trust land.5 Generally, federal courts do not have juris-
diction to review the Secretary's administrative decision unless
a constitutional claim is asserted.6 A fifth amendment due proc-
ess claim qualifies as an exception to the non-reviewability of
heirship determinations. 7
Although the court determined it possessed subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case under 28 U.S.C. § 133 18, the
unsatisfied relatives were unsuccessful in asserting their consti-
be made, dies before the expiration of the trust period and before the issuance of
a fee simple patent without having made a will disposing of said allotment as
hereinafter provide, the Secretary of the Interior, upon notice and hearing, and
under such rules as he may prescribe, shall ascertain the legal heirs of such decedent,
and his decision thereon shall be final and conclusive.
25 U.S.C. § 372 (1982).
3. 43 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982). Section 1464 provides:
The Secretary of the Interior may prescribe rules and regulations governing the
recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing claimants before his
department, and may require of such persons, agents, and attorneys, before being
recognized as representatives of claimants, that they shall show that they are of good
moral character and in good repute, possessed of the necessary qualifications to
enable them to render such claimants valuable service, and otherwise competent to
advise and assist such claimants in the presentation of their claims and such Secretary
may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude from further
practice before his department any such person, agent or attorney shown to be
incompetent, disreputable, or who refuses, to comply with the said rules and regu-
lations, or who shall with intent to defraud in any manner deceive, mislead, or
threaten any claimant, or prospective claimant, by word, circular, or by advertise-
ment.
4. 25 U.S.C. § 371. Section 371 states in relevant part:
For the purpose of determining the descent of land to the heirs of any deceased
Indian under the provision of section 348 of this title, whenever any mae and female
Indian shall have cohabited together as husband and wife according to the custom
and manner of Indian life, the issue of such cohabitation shall be, for the purpose
aforesaid, taken and deemed to be the legitimate issue of the Indians so living
together, and every Indian child, otherwise illegitimate, shall for such purpose be
taken and deemed to be the legitimate issue of the father of such child ....
5. Kicking Woman v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 1989).
6. rd. at 1207-08.
7. Ad. at 1206.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
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tutional claim because they received adequate notice and had a
full opportunity to litigate their claim.9 The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's decision upholding the administrative
law judge's decision.' 0
TAXATION: CIGARETTES
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Okla-
homa Tax Commission, 888 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1989), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 37 (1990); views of Solicitor General invited,
588 U.S.L.W. 3693 (U.S. Apr. 30, 1990).
The Oklahoma Tax Commission attempted to assess a ciga-
rette tax on the Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe (Tribe). The
Tribe sold cigarettes in a tribally-owned convenience store lo-
cated on trust land. Tribal trust land is exempt from state and
local taxation pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 465.1
The district court granted a preliminary injunction to enjoin
the tax commission from enforcing a cigarette tax against the
Tribe.2 The tax commission filed a counterclaim asking the court
to assume jurisdiction, declare that Oklahoma had jurisdiction
to tax the cigarette sales, to enforce its tax, and to enjoin the
Tribe from selling cigarettes upon which taxes were not collected
or remitted.3 The district court denied the Tribe's motion to
dismiss holding the counterclaim was a compulsory counterclaim
under Rule 13(a). 4
9. Kicking Woman, 878 F.2d at 1208.
10. Id.
1. 25 U.S.C. § 465. Section 465 provides in pertinent part:
Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act or the Act of July 28,
1955 (69 Stat. 392), as amended (25 U.S.C. 608 et seq.) shall be taken in the name
of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the
land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local
taxation.
2. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Olda. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
No. CIV-87-0338-W (W.D. Okla. Apr. 15, 1988) (WESTLAW, Allfeds Library, Unpub.
Dist. file).
3. Id.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) provides:
[Pileading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2)
the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or other process by
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that
claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1991
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The Tribe filed a motion for a new trial asserting that Fed.
R. Civ. P. 13(a) was not a congressional waiver of their sovereign
immunity. The district court denied the motion and the Tribe
appealed also claiming error because the district court ruled
nontribal members could be taxed. The tax commission cross-
appealed claiming the court erred in holding the Tribe and tribal
members were exempt from cigarette tax.
The issues before the court were: (1) whether the Tribe waived
its sovereign immunity to permit the jurisdiction for the tax
commission's counterclaim, and (2) whether the convenience
store was "Indian Country" and exempt from state taxation.
"Indian tribes have sovereign immunity from suits to which
they do not consent, subject to the plenary control of Con-
gress." s The court reasoned that a Tribe filing suit does not
waive immunity or consent to suit on a counterclaim. 6 Further,
Rule 13(a) could not be viewed as a congressional waiver. 7 The
court found the district court's assumption of jurisdiction im-
permissible because it was contrary to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.8
The Tenth Circuit also held the denial of the Tribe's request
for an injunction was error because the convenience store was
located on tribal trust land and was "Indian Country." 9 The
court rejected the argument that the land was "assimilated into
the general community of the state" finding that assimilation
did not change the status of the tribal land held in trust by the
United States. 10
The court emphasized that "Oklahoma has no authority to
tax the store's transactions unless Oklahoma has received an
5. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
888 F.2d 1303, 1304 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, III S. Ct. 37 (1990); views of
Solicitor General invited, 58 U.S.L.W. 3693 (U.S. Apr. 30, 1990).
6. Id. at 1305.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1305-06. "Indian Country" is defined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(1979) as:
(a) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including
rights.of-way running through the ieservatlon.
(b) all dependent Indian communities within borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.
10. Id. at 1306.
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independent jurisdictional grant of authority from Congress"
and the state did not show any such jurisdiction." The court
further noted that Oklahoma forewent the opportunity to obtain
jurisdiction under Public Law 280.12
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the
district court for dismissal of the counterclaim and the entry of
an injunction for the Tribe. 13
TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1989).
California assessed a timber yield tax at the time of harvest
on the value of timber that imposed tax on the first nonexempt
entity to acquire ownership of felled timber.' In 1976, the Hoopa
Tribe established a tribal corporation, Hoopa Timber Corpo-
ration, pursuant to their tribal constitution.2 The Hoopa Timber
Corporation processes the timber and sells it to off-reservation
companies. The Bureau of Indian Affairs manages the tribal
timber3 and sells to both the Hoopa Timber Corporation and
other private companies. In October 1982, the Hoopa Tribe filed
suit challenging the validity of the California tax to private
companies who purchase tribal timber from the BIA or Hoopa
Timber Corp.4
The issues before the appellate court were (1) whether federal
law preempts state activity which interferes with federal policy
regarding tribal interest; and (2) whether the tribe was entitled
to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5 The district court
granted partial summary judgment on the grounds of federal
preemption awarding both damages and prejudgment interest
but denied the tribe recovery for attorney's fees.6
"Indian lands are exempt from state real property taxes. ' 7
The court found that if the state law interferes with federal
policy, purpose, or operation involving tribal interests, the state
11. Id. at 1306-07.
12. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360).
13. Citizen Band Potawatoni Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
888 F.2d 1303, 1307 (10th Cir. 1989).
1. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE §§ 38104-38110 (West 1979).
2. HooPA TnmAL CoNsT. art. IX, § l(p).
3. See 25 C.F.R. § 163 (1990).
4. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 590 F. Supp. 198, 199 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
5. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 659-61 (9th Cir. 1989).
6. Id. at 663.
7. Id. at 659 (quoting The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866)).
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law is preempted." The court distinguished Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989), because the
California tax had no direct connection between the revenues
collected and the provision of services to tribal members, Cali-
fornia played no role in the tribe's timber activities, and the
burden of the tax concededly fell on the tribe.9 The state's weak
interest did not outweigh the substantial federal and tribal in-
terests in timber harvesting because for the tax to be valid the
California tax must bear some relationship to the activity being
taxed. 10
The court found that the preemption analysis1 fell outside
the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12 The Ninth Circuit characterized
the assertion of the right to exercise sovereignty (the right to
self-government) as a power not a right (such as protecting the
personal liberty of its members). 13 The court reasoned that "the
right to self-government is protected by treaty and federal ju-
dicial decisions" and not grounded in the Constitution or federal
statutes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
on both issues.'4
TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL
Duro v. Reina, 58 U.S.L.W. 4643 (U.S. May 29, 1990).
Albert Duro, a Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission
tribal member, resided with a Pima-Maricopa woman friend on
the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Reservation and was employed
by a tribal corporation. Duro allegedly shot and killed a 14-
year-old boy, who was a member of the Gila River Tribe, within
8. Id. (quoting Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir.
1987)).
9. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 660-61 (9th Cir. 1989).
10. Id. at 661.
11. The court decided not to analyze the conflicts between state laws and tribal
activities under the U.S. Constitution's Indian commerce clause. Id. at 662.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1986). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation off any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purpose of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
13. Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1989).
14. Id. at 663.
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boundaries of the Salt River Reservation. Federal agents arrested
Duro in California and charged him with murder and aiding
and abetting murder.' However, the United States Attorney
dismissed the federal indictment.
Duro was then placed in the custody of the Pima-Maricopa
police officers where he was charged with illegal firing of a
weapon on the Reservation. When Duro stood trial in the Pima-
Maricopa tribal court, the court denied his motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction over the case. Duro filed a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court of Arizona naming
the tribal chief judge and police chief as respondents.
The district court granted the writ because the assertion of
jurisdiction violated equal protection under the Indian Civil
Rights Act.z The district court found that the Oliphant v. Su-
quamish Indian Tribe3 decision that tribal courts did not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians applied to a nonmember
Indian because to do otherwise would constitute race discrimi-
nation. 4 The district court held discrimination existed when the
nonmember Indian did not have a right to participate in tribal
government similar to non-Indians.5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court
holding that the distinction between members and nonmembers
of the Tribe was "indiscriminate" based on United States v.
Wheeler.6 The Ninth Circuit examined the definition of "Indian
Country" 7 and found that the word, Indians, applied to both
tribal and nonmember Indians.8 The court found no racial clas-
sification and held that Duro could be subject to tribal court
jurisdiction9 because the Tribe established a rational basis for
classification due to the need for effective law enforcement.10
Further, the court of appeals found that Duro had sufficient
"contacts" with the Reservation for the tribal court to assert
jurisdiction."
1. Indian Crimes Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 949-497, § 1, 90 Stat. 585, 585.
2. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, §§ 201-203, 82
Stat. 77-78 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303).
3. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
4. Duro v. Reina, 58 U.S.L.W. 4643, 4644 (U.S. May 29, 1990).
5. Id.
6. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-28 (1978)).
7. Id. at 1143.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1145-46.
10. Id. at 1145.
11. Id. at 1144.
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The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether
an Indian tribe retains a sovereign power to assert criminal
jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian.
The United States Supreme Court reexamined both the hold-
ings of Oliphant and Wheeler. Oliphant held that an Indian
tribe did not have criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian.12
While the Supreme Court stated that Wheeler reaffimed tribal
criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by tribal members,
the Court also explained that tribes could not try nonmembers
in tribal courts. 13 The Supreme court reasoned that tribes re-
tained sovereignty and sovereignty has been held to have oc-
curred ... [when] involving relations between an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe. 14 The court said that in matters
of external relations, however, the tribe had a "dependent status"
and criminal jurisdiction could only be extended by delegation
of Congress. 5
The Supreme Court acknowledged that their decisions rec-
ognized "broader retained tribal powers outside the criminal
context."1 6 However, criminal jurisdiction involved "far more
direct intrusion on personal liberties."' 7 The Supreme Court
held that for criminal jurisdiction purposes, Duro had the same
relations with the Tribe as the non-Indian in Oliphant.8
The Supreme Court discounted the arguments based on the
historical record of CFR Court of Indian Offenses 9 possessing
jurisdiction over all Indians regardless of tribal affiliation.20 To
justify the rejection of the broad "Indian" classification, the
court relied on the Solicitor's Opinions dating back to 193621
and the personal liberty intrusion rationale. The Supreme Court
rejected the court of appeals' "contacts" test because implied
consent for jurisdiction cannot be deemed from entering an
Indian community.2
The tribe argued that a jurisdictional void would be created
precluding essential preservation of law and order on the res-
12. Duro v. Reina, 58 U.S.L.W. 4643, 4645 (U.S. May 29, 1990).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 4646.
15. Id. at 4645-46.
16. Id. at 4646.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 4646-47.
20. Id. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.2(a) (1989).
21. Duro v. Reina, 58 U.S.L.W. 4643, 4647 (U.S. May 29, 1990).
22. Id. (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978)).
23. Id. at 4648.
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ervation. The Supreme Court responded that the jurisdiction at
stake is "over relatively minor crimes" and not any greater than
non-Indians crimes.24 Also, the court said the tribes have the
power to exclude undesirable persons from their lands.25 Alter-
natively, the Supreme Court suggested Public Law 280 as a
means for the States to assume criminal jurisdiction.2
In conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals' decision holding that an Indian tribe may not assert
criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian.27
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 58
U.S.L.W. 4433 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990).
A private drug rehabilitation organization fired Alfred Smith
and Galen Black, "respondents," for ingesting peyote for sac-
ramental purposes at a Native American Church ceremony. The
respondents applied for unemployment compensation benefits at
the Employment Division. The Employment Division denied
benefits because of work-related "misconduct." The Oregon
Court of Appeals reversed because the denial of benefits violated
the first amendment free exercise clause.'
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals'
holding that the respondents were entitled to unemployment
benefits because the criminality of the consumption of peyote
under Oregon law was irrelevant to the resolution of the con-
stitutional claim. 2 The Oregon Supreme Court found that the
purpose of the Employment Division's "misconduct" provision
was to preserve the financial integrity of the compensation, not
to enforce the State's criminal laws.3 The purpose of the mis-
conduct provision was inadequate to justify the burden that
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 4649.
27. Id.
1. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon, 709 P.2d
246 (Or. 1986). The first amendment provides in pertinent part:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people to peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievance.
U.S. CoNHs. amend. I.
2. Smith v. Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon, 721 P.2d
445, 450-51 (Or. 1986).
3. Id. at 448-51.
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disqualification imposed on the respondents' religious practice.4
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded for the court to
determine whether the religious use of peyote in Oregon was
prohibited by state law5 so that the U.S. Supreme Court could
decide whether the practice is protected by the Constitution.6
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Oregon
state statute prohibited the use of peyote for religious practices
and the statute made no exception for sacramental use of pe-
yote.7
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether
the Oregon state statute prohibiting the religious use of peyote
is permissible under the first amendment free exercise clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the respondents' argument
that the Sherbert v. Vernere balancing test should be applied to
invalidate the Oregon statute because the cases that used the
test did not involve criminal prohibition on a form of conduct.9
The court noted unemployment compensation cases had a dis-
tinct feature that involved the particular circumstances behind
the applicant's unemployment. 0
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that unless an exception was
provided in the Oregon statute, citizens have no private rights
"to ignore generally applicable laws."" Allowing citizens to be
excused because of contrary religious beliefs would be permitting
the "professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself.' 2
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded it was not a constitutional
requirement to exempt a "nondiscriminatory religious prac-
tice. '1 3 The court found the Oregon statute constitutional and
4. Id. at 449.
5. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (Smith 1),
485 U.S. 660, 673-74 (1988).
6. Id.
7. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 763 P.2d
146, 148 (Or. 1988).
8. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Sherbert test balanced the gov-
ernmental actions that substantially burdened a religious practice with the compelling
governmental interests. Id. at 402-03.
9. Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 58 U.S.L.W. 4433, 4436-
37 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1990).
10. Id. at 4436 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
11. Id. at 4437.
12. Id. at 4435 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)).
13. Id. at 4438.
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consistent with the first amendment free exercise clause, thus
denying the unemployment compensation benefits.14
14. Id.
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